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FOREWORD
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established

by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to

attend the Naval War College.

In this and subsequent issues

will be found selected articles of

value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lec
tures delivered at the Naval War College and other service
institutions.
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THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
An article by

Vice Admiral D. B. Beary, U. S. N.
A Board recently met in the Navy Department to select a

group of officers of demonstrated ability to attend the next 10-

month course at the Naval War College. This course will start at

Newport, Rhode Island, on August 12, 1949. Here, while free from

the pressure of everyday military duties, the selected officers will

study the art and science of war in its broadest aspects.

Through

the study and solution of military problems they will have the

opportunity to improve their ability to think, to increase their pro

fessional stature, and thus to prepare themselves for the duties and

responsibilities of high command.

Any officer fortunate enough to

be selected for this assignment can look forward to one of the most
interesting and profitable years of his entire career.

Perhaps it is significant that when the Naval War College

was established in 1884 the Industrial Revolution was just hitting

its stride. The full impact of steam, electricity and the internal
combustion engine was only beginning to be felt.

There followed

a swift march of scientific and industrial events that brought with

it the telephone, radio and the fulfillment of Man's long urge to fly.

This coupled with the development of mass armies, powerful navies

of great mobility, great air fleets, and later, atomic energy, has re
sulted in revolutionary changes in the techniques of warfare. The
total effect of all these factors threatens to overwhelm military
thought and cause it to lose pace.

'.{'he military student is tempted

Ad:iniral Beary is President _of the Naval War College. Prior to as
suming his duties at the Naval War College he served as Com
mandant Twelfth Naval District and Commander Western Sea
Frontier. During the war he commanded Service Squadron Six in the
Pacific and the Operational Training Command in the Atlantic.

1
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to become so preoccupied with the study of technical developments in
weapons that he is in danger of losing his breadth of vision. Under
these circumstances military thinkers may forget that weapons are

merely the implements of war and ignore the continued need for a
profound understanding of the overall strategy of war. They may
overlook the fact that, throughout the remarkable scientific and in
dustrial advance of the past few generations, two factors have re
mained constant-the human mind and the geography of the Globe.

The mind of Man is still the motivating force behind all
weapons, and our preoccupation with atomic energy should not blind
us to this fact. The pattern of future victories and defeats will con
tinue to originate in that imperfect human machine which has fol
lowed much the same pattern of behavior since Man first learned to
fight.·

The second constant, the geography of the Globe, is also most
important. Land is still the habitat of Man, and so long as it re
mains so, the final objectives of war will be land objectives. Nor

have the seas that cover three-fourths of the surface of the Earth

ceased to be an important factor in modern civilization. Sea power
is the instrument with which Man has been able to adapt the broad
sea expanses of the Globe to his own uses. Sea power means ships
ships that carry !=',irplanes, ships that carry projectiles (and, in the
foreseeable future, guided missiles), ships that carry armies and the
logistics necessary to support war; and above all, ships that carry
the great bulk of world trade, the backbone of modern civilization in
peace and fo war.

The decisive weapon of modern sea power is air power. That
decisive combination known as sea-air power is a weapon whose

potentialities have only begun to become apparent. Today no �ec
tion of the Globe, however remote, can be considered insulated from

2
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the influence of this sea-air weapon. As our technological know
how continues to expand, the ways in which the broad sea areas of
the Globe can be used in peace and in war will inevitably multiply.
Thus in an age when our attention is centered on spectacu. lar scientific advances there is greater need than ever to clarify our
thinking on the fundamentals of war and the problems of command.
The quality of the commander is a decisive factor in the conduct

of war. It is still he, the commander, who must do the planning
for war.
of war.

It is still he who must direct and coordinate the weapons
It is still he upon whose ability will hinge victory or defeat.

The Naval War College has long been dedicated to the task of insur

ing that qualified officers of all services who attend its courses are
given the opportunity to attain the breadth of understanding and
vision so essential to victory in war. While there, our future com
manders are able to study the strategy, tactics and logistics of sea
power and to relate the role of sea power to the broader field of
global warfare.

The Naval War College conducts three courses, the Senior
and Junior courses in Strategy and Tactics and, of equal importance,
the Logistics course. All courses are closely integrated with one

another. The curriculum includes a study of weapons, geography,

international relations, intelligence, communications, all phases of
logistics, and atomic energy. The strategic problems are joint
problems, involving not only all branches of the armed services but
also various other agencies of government.
New developments and new ideas are weighed and discussed
in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and speech. No
dogma, doctrine or preconceived formulae with which to achieve vic
tory are taught. Officers of all services are encouraged to express
themselves freely in the numerous critiques and discussion periods
scheduled throughout the course. Differences of opinion and divided

3
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conclusions are encouraged rather than discouraged.

They are con

sidered stimulating and helpful in our search for solutions to the
pressing and puzzling problems we face today.

Without these hon

est d_ifferences, freely expressed, there would exist a fatal weakness

within our entire :military establishment. No individual or group of

individuals is expected to go along with the popular current of
opinion.

Each is free to reach his own conclusion based on his

own logic and the facts as he has been able to determine them.

Each is required to think for himself and to apply his own reason
ing power to the solution of military problems.

The philosophy of the Naval War College can be summed up

in the simple statement that we must never permit our thinking to
become static.
ideas.

There must be a constant boil and ferment of new

Old ideas and concepts must be subjected to the most care

ful scrutiny.

Newer and better solutions to our problems must

always be sought, and when they are found, there must still be the

dissatisfaction of knowing there are better answers yet to be
found.

The Naval War College is the catalytic agent through which

officers, who possess the energy and the perspective, can achieve

that mental stature so essential to the exercise of high command.

Note: This article is reprinted by permission of the "Army and Navy
Journal."
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THE ATTACK

A lecture delivered by

Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott
at the Naval War College
October 21, 1948

Professor Spiegel in his book,
defines this subject as follows:

The Economics of Total War,

"Economic warfare is designed to destroy the enemy's
economic war potential by physically destroying war essential assets and by blockading supplies from abroad........"
It "requires the coordinated blending of military and econ
omic measures."
Colonel Clabaugh of the faculty of the Industrial College of

the Armed Forces in a recent lecture in that college's Economic
Mobilization course said:
"......so far as the literal and figurative meaning of the
words is concerned, the term 'economic warfare' could have
been applied to economic mobilization for war or to pro
duction or even to commercial rivalry in peace. But cus
tom and usage make language as well as law. Long before
we entered the war, in fact before the outbreak of war in
Europe, economic warfare had come to mean the strangula
tion of the enemy-blockade, literally, by ships at sea and
figuratively, by diplomatic and economic measures. 'Econ
omic warfare' should be used only in the special meaning
given to it by custom and usage....... ,Briefly, it is 'the sum
of all those measures which injure the enemy's war po
tential.' "

In order to place economic warfare in some perspective, it
may serve a useful purpose at this point to make a number of ob

servations regarding it. Economic warfare of course is not a new
Professor. Abbott has been on the faculty of Harvard University
since 1932-for the past several years as Professor of Business
Economics.

6
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development. It is probably as old as warfare itself. Certainly in
Plutarch's account of the wars of the Greeks and the Persians
there are numerous happenings which we would characterize as fall
ing within the orbit of economic warfare. In the Napoleonic wars
measures of ,economic attack and defense played a prominent part,
and in our own Civil War the blockade of the South was of very
great consequence.

With the passage of time, the realignment of nations, and
the development of new weapons, economic warfare continually
changes its form. The development of air power and of submarine
warfare has of. course greatly widened its scope and objectives. On

the other hand, total war on a global scale has tended to diminish the
feasibility of naval blockade in the older, narrower sense of blockad

ing a hostile coast line and has fostered a growth of new measures
which I will speak of in a moment.

It has been commonly observed that economic warfare en
compasses many ordinary peacetime practices of business, such as
foreign investment; patent interchange agreements,establishment of
branch plants.in foreign countries, and commercial relationships of
many kinds. At the other extreme are operations of a strictly mili

tary character, undertaken in wartime., that possess an economic
purpose, such as submarine warfare and the air attacks on the Ger
man synthetic oil plants at Leuna in the last war. In between these
extremes come such operations as our efforts to deprive the Axis of
Spanish and Portuguese wolfram through preclusive buying, or our

efforts through the use of ship warrants and denial of bunkering
facilities to force the Argentines to employ their merchant tonnage
in shipping services advantageous to us.

In general, the effectiveness of economic warfare increases
or decreases directly in proportion to the military strength and suc

cess of the nation or alliance.

Many illustrations of the validity of

6
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this proposition can be found. For example, the character of the
trade agreements which the United States was able to negotiate
with neutrals-Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey
changed rapidly and in our favor between 1942 and 1944 as allied
military successes increased. As fortune favored our arms it was
possible to put increasing pressure on neutral countries and areas

and, consequently, progressively to deprive the Axis of essential raw
materials. This observation perhaps is nothing more than a further
confirmation of the fact that economic warfare in itself can probab
ly never be a decisive factor independent of military action, although
it can very substantially contribute to military successes.

Probably economic warfare is most successful when a partic
ular action is undertaken on such a �cale and so rapidly that the
economy attacked has no chance to accommodate itself to the blow
or to develop substitute materials or alternative trade routes or con
nections, with the result that the effects of a sudden and unexpected
action tend to become cumulative. If the country is suddenly and

completely cut off from some item such as ball bearings, or if all

foreign trade relationships with neutrals are swiftly and violently

distorted, the effects on a country's economy will be very far reach
ing, particularly in a military sense. Reasoning of this type is of
course one of the bases for apprehension regarding a sneak attack
on industrial areas in the United States.

On the other hand, it is easy to overestimate the effects of
particular operations designed to accomplish economic dislocation.
The strategic bombing of German industry and transport prior to
the spring of 1944, for example, seemingly injured the German

economy much less than was currently believed in this cou�try. A
commonly quoted judgment of one of the officials of the British
Ministry of Economic Warfare is to the effect that MEW did not un
derestimate Germany's needs or resources, but that German in-

7
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genuity in developing substitutes for critical materials and com
ponents was greatly underestimated.

It is clear, of course, that there are two bases for economic

warfare.

The first may be described as the economic and business

facts characteristic of a nation's economy.

Economic and commer

cial geography, sources of raw materials, peacetime trade flows,

commercial and banking connections of important companies, the
location of key plants and industries-these determine the points in
a nation's position that are susceptible to economic attack.

Great

Britain, for example, was vulnerable to a food shortage; Nazi Ger
many was vulnerable to a shortage of gasoline. The second basis
is economic intelligence, or knowledge of these facts.

The focus of

such intelligence must be to determine the shortages that exist in the

economy at the outbreak of war or that appear during hostilities.

In order to prosecute economic warfare successfully the ne

cessity for the collection, collation, and analysis of economic in
telligence is self-evident.

Its importance can hardly be overesti

mated and it is essential in every phase of this type of operation,

from the selection of targets for strategic bombing to knowledge of
shortages in the enemy's territory.

A

great deal, probably a major portion, of the information

needed for an effective system of economic intelligence can be
gleaned from published sources.

The problem is one of organ

izing to do the job, especially in peacetime.

In the last war there

was a great deal of overlapping, confusion, and duplication among
the agencies concerned with this task, and there is no question

that far too much time elapsed before an effective economic in

telligence organization was achieved.

The inescapable conclusion

is that much of the job of collecting economic intelligence can and
should be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

8
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A very large part though perhaps not all of the necessary
information that is not available from published sources prob
ably exists in the files of government · departments and of busi
ness concerns in this country. The logic of the problem of as
sembling data for economic warfare requires that any particu
lar country base its intelligence system on the organizations and
sources of information at its command. (Traditionally, Great
Britain has used shipping concerns, banks, foreign trade con
nections, and its control of the international news orgahizations
for this purpose, in addition to its diplomatic and consular repre
sentatives; Germany, as we all know, used German companies or
plants located abroad, patent interchange agreements, and the
various kinds of German emigrant societies; Russia clearly uses
the Communist Party and its fellow travelers for this purpose).
It is doubtful if any systematic effort has been made to collect and
collate information in the hands of leading American business
corporations with far-flung foreign connections, such as the large
banks, General Motors, Standard of New Jersey, International
Harvester, and so on. The omission is a matter of great regret,
since if such information were collected and collated it would
certainly be very comprehensive.
The need for this kind of effort appears to be the greater
since, insofar as I understand thei:;e matters, there is relatively
little knowledge of the workings of the Russian economy in this
country, at least as compared with other major powers. This lack
of an integrated body of data makes offensive economic warfare
against the Soviet considerably more difficult than would other
wise be the case. Incidentally, I believe that careful analysis of
the trade agreements that Russia has concluded since V-J Day,
and is concluding, both with countries inside and with countries
outside the Iron Curtain, should be one of the more fruitful
sources of this kind of knowledge, in that such agreements might
suggest actual or potential shortages in the Russian economy.

9
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We come now to the techniques of economic warfare-block
ade, export licensing, preclusive buying, control of shipping, black
lists, blocking of foreign assets, and all the rest.
Historically, the backbone of economic warfare has been the
naval blockade in the strict sense of the word. Reliance has been
placed on the stationing of naval vessels on an enemy coast and out
side enemy harbors, on patrol of the sea lanes, on observation of ship

ping in neutral roa:dsteads, and on the careful designation of contra
band and, when possible, its seizure. During the two World Wars
this pattern has been altered by three well-defined developments.
The first was the growth of the navicert system, a system which re

sultE!d in great economies in the use of warships in supervising neu

tral shipping.. The second has been the development of the long dis

tance or paper blockade, which in its more advanced form seeks not
only to cut off all supplies for the enemy at the point of origin,

namely, in neutral countries, but even goes so far as to mould the
economy of neutral territory to your own use. The third circum
stance has been the breakdown of distinctions between contraband
and noncontraband goods, whatever the lawyers may say.

The reasons for these changes are clear. Global warfare and
conflicts between world-wide alliances, together with the develop
ment of new weapons such as the airplane and the submarine, have
greatly increased the need for employing naval vessels in strictly
naval operations and on convoy duty.. Conversely, the amount of
naval vessels' time available for blockade purposes has been re
duced. Furthermore, the larger the land mass and the volume of
resources controlled by the enemy, the fewer are the objectives that
can be achieved by a close blockade. The number of strategic items
in short supply for the Nazis in 1942 was really very small
petroleum was perhaps the only item in which shortage ever be
came acute.

Moreover, the logics of total war on a global scale

10
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make useless any distinctions between contraband and noncontra
band items. Finally, the necessities of total war require that a
combatant. not only devote all of his resources to the war effort but
also, so far as is possible, compel neutral nations to devote their
resources also to purposes advantageous to him. In pursuit of this
objective the combatant, of course, makes use of shipping con
trols, trade agreements, preclusive buying, financial measures, and
any other procedures available to him·.
An ancillary purpose sought in the effort to control the
trade of neutrals is to deprive the enemy of any advantages of trade
with other countries or the use of any assets that he owns located
outside his own boundaries. The ultimate goal is to deprive him of
the benefits that arise from the fact that he is a member of a com
munity of nations.
With reference to the navicert system, . it should be pointed
out that the Navy has three, perhaps four functions to perform un
der this procedure: the issue of the navicert, although this can per
haps be done by other agencies; apprehension of blockade runners;
the enforcement of the rules of blockade at control points; and per
iodic spot checks of merchant vessels on the high seas to ensure that
the blockade rules are being observed.
I

Should a condition of open hostilities develop between· this
country and the Soviet there can be little doubt that the measures of
economic warfare existing at the end of World War II would be
quickly reimposed. The export control measures which, as you
know, were originally instituted under the Export Control Act of
July, 1940 as a means of conserving scarce items, would be re
instituted. They would be reimposed partly for their original pur
pose of conservation, partly as a means of putting pressure on and
bargaining with neutral areas or with areas producing resources

11
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

15

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 2, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

essential to our own effort, and partly to ensure that no products of
American fabrication were exported and fell into enemy hands.
War Trade Agreements, which are essentially a mechanism
for rationing noncombatant areas and for bringing the operation
of their economies into conformance with your own needs, would be
quickly negotiated. The rationing of neutral or noncombatant areas
has a number of separate aspects, each one of which merits atten
tion. In the first place, you cannot afford to give these areas all
they want of many commodities, or even all the shipping space that
they want. In the last war, the East Coast of South America was
not only severely rationed as regards its receipts of newsprint and
steel but also as regards shipping space allocated to it. In the
second place, it is important that only the essential needs of neutral
areas be satisfied; otherwise it is entirely possible that scarce items
may be reexported to the enemy. In the third place, rationing of
the items that these areas want from you is the best lever for as
suring that you get the supplies from them that are needed in your
war program. In the last war it was made very explicit by the
Belgian Congo that continued shipments of scarce minerals, fats
and oils and fibers were contingent upon the Congo's receipt of
manufactured goods and such picturesque items as. old clothes and
tinware essential for trade with the natives.
The injury to the Russian war effort that such measures
might inflict would in general be determined by the extent to
which the Russian economy and war potential is dependent upon
imports of raw materials, components, and technical skills from
abroad. I will not attempt to appraise this matter, since the Rus
sian war potential is the subject of another lecture in your course.
I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of these
measures might be influenced to some extent by another factor,
namely, the amount of territory controlled by the Russians. The
12
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greater the size of the land mass controlled by a military . economy
the less it tends to be subject to the pressures of economic warfare.
When Nazi Germany overran Poland, the Balkans, and Norway she
greatly increased the resources at her command, not the least of
which was man power. On the other hand, the addition of terri
tory may lead to greater shortages of certain kinds. For example,
Holland is a deficit food area, and the fact that the Nazis overran

the Netherlands must have increased the pressure on their own food
supplies. One may presume that the use of French industrial ca
pacity by the Germans increased the pressure on German petrol
eum resources.

The fact that the United States welded Latin

America to our war economy-insofar as we did-required that we

supply Latin America with minimum amounts of shipping services,
newsprint, flour and so forth. As is well known, our efforts to
service the Caribbean and the East Coast of South America re
sulted in a number of submarine sinkings that might not other

wise have taken place and consequently intensified the shortage of
merchant shipping. In short, if Russia overran Western Europe

it would increase her war potential, but it would also increase her
vulnerability to certain types of economic pressure, though prob
ably not in equal degree.

If war between the United States and the Soviet should
break ou:t, the long distance or so-called paper blockade, with its
three basic instruments, the navicert, the ship's navicert, and the
ship's warrant, would certainly be imposed immediately.
As you know, the navicert originated in the First World
War while the United States was still a neutral. It was originally
a device for expediting the shipment of noncontraband goods from
one neutral country to another, a sort of permit for passage through
the blockade, given at the point of origin. It speedily developed
into a system of controlling all goods passing in trade between the

neutral countries.

18
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A ship's navicert which was a logical outgrowth of the
navicert for a particular consignment, was given when all the items
in a ship's .manifest had been navicerted, and permitted a vessel
to make a single voyage through naval controls. The ship's navi
cert provided a description of the ship and its proposed itinerary;
a list of officers, crew, and passengers; a description of the cargo?
ship's stores, mail, and .money; and an account of the source, des
tination, consignor, and consignee of the cargo. When the appli
cation for a ship's navicert was received, the crew and passenger
lists were checked, and 09jectionable persons were removed before
the issue of the navicert. The effect of the navicert system was that
all unnavicerted ships and cargo became subject to immediate
seizure.
A ship's warrant entitled a vessel to the use of British and
Allied port facilities-bunkering, ship stores, repairs, and so forth.
In order to receive a warrant the owner agreed that no vessel
owned or operated by him would sail to or from the navicert area
without a ship's navicert, that he would not sell or part with ef
fective control of any vessel owned by him without the approval of
the proper authorities, and that he would not employ any enemy
company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or other facil
ities. In addition, fleet owners were generally required to charter
portions of their fleets to the issuing authority; in the last war
that meant either the British Ministry of War Transport or the War
Shipping Administration. I have always been under the im
pression that the presence of Swedish vessels in the Pacific in
services designated by the British was a result of this kind of lever
on neutral shipping.
The extent to which the imposition of shipping controls may
directly jnjure the Soviets seems to me very problematical. On the
other hand, the use of these controls would clearly increase the re14
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss2/1
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sources at the command of this country and of 0-reat Britain, and
it is in this respect that they would be chiefly useful.
If the cold war should turn into a hot war, it seems certain
that proclaimed lists of individuals and of business concerns com
mercially "untouchable" would be speedily developed and that Rus
sian-owned funds and other assets in territories under our control
would be sequestered. Here again the direct injury to the Russians
would be doubtful. Certainly there would be no important body of
Russian assets owned in t�is country to sequester-nothing like
the $7,955,000,000 of assets that were blocked in this courttry dur
ing the last war.
In short, the ocean-borne commerce of Russia, particularly
that part that could be reached by the navicert system or the pro
claimed list, seems to be very important to the Soviet. Her land
bounµaries to the Near East and the Far East would be difficult if
not impossible to seal through measures of economic warfare. The
conclusion is, I think, that strategic bombing would be far more
effective in breaking down the Russian war potential than would
these other mechanisms.
By way of conclusion let us consider some of the economic
aspects of the cold war. These considerations are important on
their own merits. More importantly, the· degree of success with
which the United States and the Soviets prosecute their respective
programs of economic warfare prior to the time hostilities break
out-if they do-will greatly influence the possibilities of economic
warfare after the event.
The general pattern is clear. The Soviets have their policy
of economic erosion; the United States has the Marshall Plan.
The chief, the most interesting, and the most baffling charac-

15
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teristic of the Russian policy is its destructive character.

The

erosion, undermining and· collapse of other economies serves the

Soviet purpose. Only in minor degree, apparently, are the Russians

interested in preserving the productive capacity or trade connections

of territories under their control and in adapting these facilities

for their own use.

In this respect Russian policy largely differs

from other types of economic penetration that the world has seen.

On the whole, and notwithstanding some well-known exceptions,

the British and the Germans have traditionally sought to pre

serve the economic potential of an area being penetrated, and

even to build upon it. Their purpose for the most part was to

turn the productive capacity and facilities in such territories to

their own use, not to destroy them.

As I have said, Russian policy is furthered by .the spread

of economic chaos, by civil disturbance, the diminution of production

and trade, inflation of currency, dislocation of channels of trade,

and the disappearance of plants and individual business concerI).s.

One of my friends points out that the Russians are masters of

"economic cannibalism," the absorption or destruction. of econ

omic activity outside Russia, leaving the Russian economy, poor
as it may be, without a rival.

In this policy, especially in its early stages, manipulation of

the monetary and banking· structure is a key element.

As we all

know, inflation of the currency and prostitution of the banking
syste:r:n in a given a!:ea is the quickest way to check the economic
processes of production and distribution and to discourage. busi

nessmen and the spirit of enterprise.

and credit was recognized by Lenin.

The importance of money

Both Nazis and Communists

have used control of money and banking mechanisms as a means

of breaking down the economies of satellite, peripheral states,

and

the position that control of the currency has assumed in the Ber
lin situation seems to be not wholly accidental.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss2/1

20

Naval War College: February 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
As against this program the United States has as a counter
measure the Marshall Plan, with all the implications and ramifica
tions covered by that phrase. It is commonly said that this plan
is designed for the economic restoration of Europe, but this seems
to be not a wholly adequate statement. In an immediate sense the
plan was designed to check economic deterioration in western
Europe; in a larger sense it is presumably intended to restore an
economic balance of power in Europe, a sine qua non of the restora

tion of a military balance of power.

Certain aspects of the Marshall Plan, however, particularly

aspects that are significant under economic warfare, I do not think

are fully appreciated. In what I am about to say I am relying
chiefly on three very competent documents: A Survey of the
Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, United Nations

Eco.nomic Commission for Europe, Geneva, March 30, 1948; a sup
plementary document published by the same source, Selected World
Economic Indices, Lake Success, July, 1948; and The Eighteenth
Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, pub-·
lished at Basie, Switzerland, June 14, 1948.

It

does not seem to be valid to look on the Marshall Plan as

a means of restoring European industrial production to prewar
levels. Such a restoration had in fact been substantially achieved
before the end of 1947. Industrial production of 14 major nations
of Europe, excluding Germany, in the latter half of that year was

on the average 99% of prewar production; 8 nations* which in
1938 accounted for 34 % of European production had exceeded
prewar output, in some instances by considerable margins. This
level of production seems to have been achieved in large measure
because of the increased labor supply in Europe and by a more
* Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
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complete use of the supply than was the case in 1938, since
European postwar output per man-hour has been much lower than
in the prewar period. The conclusion is, I think, that in the field
of industrial production the logical aim of the Marshall Plan must
be to raise output above prewar levels. This can take place only

over a period of time, as capital equipment is increased. Itis also
probable that an increase in facilities is a necessary condition for a

rise in the man-hour output to something like its prewar level.

In the field of trade the picture is very different. In current
prices, European trade is above the prewar· level, but in terms of
1938 prices it remains substantially below that of 1939. The Bank
of International Settlements Report states: "Expressed in real

value, the trade of European countries with one another in 1947

-

represented only 56 % of the prewar volume, while Europe's trade

in the non-European countries·amounted to 78% as regards exports
,,
and 106 % as regards imports______ The relatively high level of im.:.

ports of course

fa in good part attributable to American generosity.

The chief area in which thi� "deficiency" in intra-European

trade appears is in the drop in German trade with Western

Europe (something like one• billion dollars of trade in each di
rection having disappeared), and secondarily in the shrinkage of
trade flowing between western Europe and central and eastern
European countries. The conclusion appears to be that a major ob

jective of American policies must be an increased volume of
European trade. Accomplishment of this goal will in turn be
largely dependent upon the establishment of sound monetary con
ditions, balanced budgets, and relaxation of. controls· upon foreign
exch,ange and international commerce. These. problems of course
are chiefly domestic problems for the countries concerned. Insofar
as the· Marshall Plan does not induce or force attainment of these
conditions it will not realize its potentialities.

18
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In some ways the major European problem is the loss to

Europe, as the result of the war, of "invisible receipts" from
foreign invesments, shipping, insurance, and so forth.

The Bank

of International Settlements Report states that in the period 1933-

1938, "The net income from Europe's investment in non-European

countries was equal to about $1.4 milliard ... , .. and accounted for

about one-quarter of Europe's total imports from non-European

countries; iri 1947 the corresponding net income would seem to
have been only $400 million, some 30 percent of what it was be

fore the war."

Here again the conclusion is plain.

Unless

Europe, during the period in which this country supplies aid, so

reorganizes its economy as to adapt itself to these new conditions
the Marshall Plan will fall short of its purposes. But this adapta
tion is again essentially a domestic problem, or perhaps a com

plex of domestic problems, for European countries.

The Marshall

Plan in and of itself here can do little more than buy time---time for
the European economy to adjust itself.

19
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THE NEAR EAST
A lecture delivered by

Professor Hans Kohn
at the Naval War College
November 5, 1948

As y�u know from my lecture on Russia, I am convinced
that we cannot approach any problem today except by seeing it in
its historical perspective. It was exactly one hundred fifty years

.ago that the Near or Middle Eastern question was opened up for
Western Europe.

For we may say that before 1798 the Near and

Middle East entered the attention of Europe or the Western world

little, if at all. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, which had
been the center of world politics and the center of world civiliza
tion until about 1450 of our era, disappeared entirely from our
sight after that. It may be said that Columbus went to discover

America, (which as you know he never intended to do) because

of the very fact that the Mediterranean had been closed, the Near
East had been obliterated, and with the Near East the two great

Asiatic trade. routes, the two trade routes from Europe to the
Far East, one -leading through Alexandria and the Red Sea, the

second through Antioch and the Persian Gulf. These two trade
routes, from antiquity until 1400 had been the most important
eommercial routes of history, those on which depended the import

.ance of Italy. Both in antiquity and in the middle ages, the vital
ity and leadership of Italy, of Rome and later of Venice and Gen
oa, arid the phenomenon of the Renaissance would have been im

possible without Italy's geographic strategic position in relation
to these two trade routes. In the 15th century the victory of the
Turks closed these· trade · routes to Western mankind.

With that

Professor Kohn is Professor of History at Smith College. His
lecture on "Russia" appeared in a previous issue of the "Information
Service."
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moment began the decay of Italy, the decay of the Mediterranean
and the rise of the Atlantic powers.
It was one hundred fifty years ago that the strategic genius
of Napoleon reopened the Middle East and discovered what is in
my mind the most important fact in the world situation today,
namely : that the Middle East is the strategic hub of the Old
World. Whoever controls the Middle East undoubtedly controls
the Old World. General Bonaparte who, as you all know, was a

Mediterranean, born in Corsica, was keenly aware of it. He was
never a Frenchman by geographic loyalty; his only real loyalty
belonged to the Mediterranean. He dreamt, as in our own time

his small imitator Mussolini did, of the resurrection of the Mediter
ranean empire, not anymore for its own sake but as a key for the

control of the world. In 1798, Bonaparte had the immensely daring
conception, a conception similar to that of Alexander the Great,
to land an expeditionary force in Egypt and to push on from Egypt

through Syria, Iraq and Iran into India.

He was fascinated by

the idea which, since then, all world conquerors have had, whether
it was Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, to destroy the British Empire
as the only bulwark standing between, on the one hand, the aspira
tion to world domination, and on the other hand, the world of

liberty. He wished to deal the British Empire a deadly blow by
going across the ancient land route to India. You know he pushed on
from Egypt to Palestine and Haifa, as we call it today, and it was

only because of the pestilence in camp and because of certain news

coming from France that he had to call off his venture and return
to France. From this moment two things remained. . One is what

I would call "the regeneration of Islam." Napoleon's administration
in Egypt, though very short-lived, left deep traces. There was a

man of energy, ruthlessness, strength.

His name was Mohamed

Ali, a simple soldier in the Turkish Army, an Albanian by birth.
By his intelligence, and by his unscrupulous .ruthlessness he made
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himself governor or pasha of Egypt, then a Turkish province. As
pasha he learned enough fr<?m French influence to wish to modernize
Egypt, to create a modern army, even to begin a modern navy, to
introduce modern economy. Islam was awakened from hundreds
of years of lethargy, apathy and sleep. The present king of Egypt,
Farouk is a descendant of the Mohamed Ali whom I have just
mentioned.
But the second, and more important consideration for us is
that Napoleon drew attention to the long forgotten trade routes
and the strategic position of the Middle East and drew the at
tention of the British there, and from that moment on it has been
British policy to make sure that the Middle East does not fall
into the hands of any great military power and that the Middle
East will be kept open. From 1798 until today, all British foreign
policy and all British strategy has been dominated by the one con
viction not to allow any great military power to establish itself in
the Middle East. Today we have inherited the British task both
politically and strategically. It is, in my opinion, our foremost
consideration not to allow any great military power to claim ex
clusive control of the Middle East, because whoever holds. the Mid
dle East, holds Africa,.Asia and Europe. This has been shown very
clearly in the two wars which have been fought, since Napoleon,
for world control.

c.:

The two wars fought for world control, World War I, and
World War II, both had one of the decisive battlefields in the Near
East. It was much less noticed in the United States, yet in World
War I the Germans made a very determined effort, with the
help of the Turks, to capture the Suez Canal and to drive the
British out of the Middle East. At that time the attempt was
made from the east, with the help of Turkey, to the Suez Canal.
The British defeated the attempt and, in a counter-attack, oc
cupied Jerusalem and later drove up to Syria. There is one im-
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portant point in this struggle in World War I against Germany
and Turkey: the British tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arabs.
The Turks were then the enemies of Britain and allied with Ger
many. The only people who could be organized against the Turks
were the Arabs. The Arabs were the first great force in Islam,
the first great conquering race of the Mohammedan religion. They
had been obscured and dominated by the Turks, and the British
now tried to reawaken their national pride, the memory of the
centuries of Arab greatness. They were quite successfully sup
ported in that indirectly by Americans since the most important
educational institutions in the Arab world were the American insti
tutions, especially the American University of Beirut in Lebanon,
the greatest educational institution in the Near East. The Ameri
can missionaries there tried to arouse an Arab awakening which
had no connection with that provoked by the British. The Ameri
can one had been more on the intellectual side, educational ; the
British one more on the· military, political side. The British ap
pealed above all to the Arab ruler, to the Arab sheik in Mecca, in
the capital of Islam, in the foremost city of Mohammedan
tradition, where a descendant of Mohammed himself, by the name
of Hussein Ibn Ali was then the leading member of the aristocracy,
or as the Arabs called it, the Sharif of Mecca. His son is Ab
dullah, King of Trans-Jordan at present, and from that fact we
can understand both the long lasting British ties with Ab
dullah of Trans-Jordan and Abdullah's ambition to play .a great
role in the Arabic or Mohammedan world-for Abdullah is the
only surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. It was a romantic Eng
lishman, one of the strange figures with which the otherwise gen
erally "dull" British stock is quite rich, this rather strange exotic
figure, T. E. Lawrence, who went out to Arabia and started what
he descri.bed as the "revolt in the desert."• The British suc
ceeded, with the help of·the Arabs in defeating the Turks and the
German attempt to dominate the Middle East.
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In World War II the Middle East was again a decisive
battlefield. You gentlemen will remember as much as I do the
fateful month of June 1940 when the German armies had
triumphed all over Europe; when Hitler and Stalin were close
friends and allies, when France lay crushed and when Italy had
joined the war on the side of Germany to be in for the kill of
the French and British empires; when Marshal Petain, certain
ly a soldier of some knowledge, expected that within three weeks
- Britain would fall. At that moment the question was for me, who
knew the Middle East very well, not what would happen in the
British Isles but what would happen in the Middle East, because
if the Hitler-Mussolini combination had taken. hold of the Middle
East, . then there was no doubt with me that Asia. was lost to Hit-.
ler and the Japanese. Lost, I am entirely convinced, irrevoc;ably for
any foreseeable future. At that moment Mussolini entered the war,
and at that time we did not know, though some of us suspected,
that the famous Fascist army, navy, and air force did not exist
really. We all were impressed by Mussolini. You remember his
picture in the papers then, with open mouth, his jaw forward, de
claring that "In the next war, Italian bayonets will decide the
war and Italian airplanes will blacken the skies." It was in 1938
that he declared that to the Italian senate. You may remember
that the air force impressed us when Balbo flew over with his
fliers to Chicago, so much so that I think even today an' avenue
in Chicago is called Avenue Balbo. In any case, it impressed us
tremendously. And now in June 1940 the British had 30,000
men along the Suez canal with about 500 second rate planes. The
30,000 men were mostly imperial colonial troops, Australians, with
some Negroes from Africa, and others. Mussolini had 150,000
men of the best soldiers in Eritrea and the same number under
the Duke of Aosta in Ethiopia. I was afraid then that the su
perior Italian air force and the two armies; could move in a pin25
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cer movement on Egypt and the Suez canal, liquidate thE:! British
situation there, and establish an impregnable situation for the
Axis from Morrocco to China. If that had happened, our land
ing in Africa would not have succeeded.
It was because of the unique luck and the courage of the
British that the Italians, and later Rommel, were defeated. I am en
tirely convinced that, should a next war come, and I have good
reasons to believe that it will not come if the West be
comes really united and prepared, that the decisive spot will
again be the Middle East. That is the reason why we must make
sure, and are making sure I think successfully, that the Middle

The

East does not fall into Russian hands.
Russians have tried
days of Catherine
the
since
East
Middle
the
of
to gain control
the II, who conquered the Crimea, the North Shore of the Black
Sea. Catherine hated her son, the future Czar Paul, but loved

her grandchildren. She selected their names, not Paul, and she
named her oldest grandchild Alexander, in memory of Alexander

the Great who conquered Asia, and named her second son Con
stantine in memory of Constantine the First, who established Con

stantinople, Byzantium, as the seat of the world empire. From
the days of Catherine II to the days of Stalin, the Middle East has
been the prime ambition of the Russians. The British never tried
to occupy or rule the Middle East. Primarily they wished to ex
clude Russia and Napoleon and the Germans. Our policy is the
same. We are int�rested in excluding Russia, and so far we have
done well. I can assure you from a close knowledge of the Middle
East, where I lived for eight years, and from a study of the

situation in the Middle East, that we have succeeded beyond any
body's expectations, with relatively small cost so far, in averting
an imminent threat to the Middle East which two years ago seemed

unavertable.

If we could achieve in China what we have done in the
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Middle East, I think we could begin to feel much more secure
than we do now.
Two years ago Greece was threatened from Albania, Yugo
slavia and Bulgaria. Greece is important for us because the Greeks
are the only sea-faring people in the Near and Middle East. Neither

the Russians nor the Turks nor the Arabs nor the Persians are a
sea-faring people. The Greeks are, by their history and by the_ir
whole geography. Their islands are strategic islands and Greece

is destined to be the key to further Russian penetration. East of
Greece is Turkey and two years ago the Russians put forward
strong demands for a large part of Eastern Anatolia. There is a
claim, which is not unfounded, that centuries ago Armenians lived
there. But you can't turn the wheel of history back centuries,
though many nationalists are trying it. Three Soviet professors
proved to their own satisfaction: and that of 'Mr. Stalin that

northern Turkey, on the shore of the Black Sea, had once been
Georgian territory that should be annexed to Soviet Georgia.

Turkey would thus lose all Kurdistan, these commanding heights
from which the road to the Persian Gulf lies open. Secondly the
Russians claimed then the right to put their bases into the Dar
danelles, which would have practically meant domination of

Istanbul or Constantinople and of Turkey.

The third important

thing is that, two years ago a Soviet puppet government, backed
by Soviet troops, was established in Iran, in Azerbaijan. This

government was a threat to Turkey and to the Persian Gulf. That
was the situation two years ago, and everybody was convinced that

if Russian armed columns break through to the Persian Gulf, that
means to our oil fields there, nothing could stop them.

Now two years have gone by. There is no actual threat
whatsoever at present to Greece or Turkey or to Iran. The Soviet
government in Azerbaijan has been liquidated. All Russian troops
are out of Iran. No new demands for Turkish territory are voiced

27
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although the situation in Greece is rotten and will remain rotten,
for the very simple reason that the Greek nation has never yet
learned to work together without being at the brink of a civil
war. In spite of that, no Russian or Yugoslav or Bulgarian soldier
has transgressed into Greece; on the other hand the front of Stalin
on the frontiers of Greece has been broken. Yugoslavia is to

day no longer an entirely dependable satellite of Russia, an aston
ishing change. Two years ago Greece was Russia's; today Stalin
cannot be very certain of Tito's Yugoslavia. So I would say that,
so far as I can see, the situation in the Middle East, with rather
little expenditure, has been immensely strengthened.
That is important, not only for strategic reasons, but also

for the oil.

You all know about the British oil which exists in
southwestern Persia. The concession in northern Iraq is one half
British, one fourth American and one fourth French.

By far the

most important concession of all, those in Saudi Arabia, are en
tirely American. This oil is needed for three purposes. One is
for the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan. We
can't send oil from the U. S. The Europeans have no oil; theirs

comes from the Middle East.

The Russians don't wish Europe to
recover. They would like to cut up the Middle Eastern oil. Second,
the British navy depends upon the Middle Eastern oil and the Brit
ish navy is as much our interest as our navy is. And third, even
our navy depends on Middle Eastern oil.

Now some people here in the United States tell you "Why
should we worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Com
pany?" I must tell you that they are right. We should not worry
about the profits of the Standard Oil Company. But the whole
question thus put, is pure demagogy. We need the oil from the
Middle East, irrespective of any profit or not, for our strategic
survival. If people come and tell you that the State Department
is following a certain policy in the Middle East because it is
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subservient to the oil interests, that is the barest nonsense! We
must hold the Middle East for our survival-strategically, and be
cause we·need the oil, not for the profits for the Standard Oil Com
pany. Our vital national interests are involved there.
That is one point, and the second point is that we cannot
hold these regions without close cooperation with the native peoples.
That is what the British learned. The British did not know it fifty
years ago; the British . learned that they cannot rely on India or
Pakistan, on Arabia or Turkey, without the sympathy and coopera
tion of the native populations; These native populations, the Turk,
Arab, Iranian or Persian, are today in a state of national awaken
ing, of the awakening of political consciousness, in a feeling of im
mense pride which can be very easily hurt. They are not like the
British or-ourselves, so secure that they would riot mind pin-pricks
or anything like that. They are immensely jealous of their national
position. And I am entirely convinced that we cannot hold these
regions without the sympathy of the native populations on our side.
The British enlisted the sympathy of the Arabs in World War II,
especially of the two most important · Arab rulers. One was Ibn
Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, a very strong personality, a man
of unusual power as you probably know. King Ibn Saud is a man
of about sbtty-eight just now. King Ibn Saud began his life as a
small sheikh. He was a small potentate leading fanatical Mo
hammedans called the Wahhabis. It was through their fanaticism
and his genius of leadership that he conquered the whole of
Arabia. For the first time sin�e Mohammed, he .united the whole
of Arabia and brought peace and order there. Ibn Saud is un
doubtedly a person of unusual strength, a commanding personal
ity, who created in the desert, in the immense poverty of the nomad
ic tribes what was, for the first time, a progressive orderly govern
ment. The second man is King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, the only
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surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. The British understood that
they had to enlist the friendship of these two . men, and it was
due to their friendship that in World War II, in the most tragic
situation in the Middle East, the Arabs did not cut the British com
munications.

Though the Arab could have never waged open war,

they could have been very damaging if they wanted to, but they

stood loyally with Britain.

Britain cannot forget that.

Britain

knows that her security and by her security, our security, depends

on establishing friendship with the Arabs and with the Turks.

And now in the last few words I wish to talk about the

Turks because there is nothing more astonishirtg and nothing more

indicative of the future of the Middle East than the transforma
tion of Turkey. Some of you may have been to Turkey before

World War I.

Some American ships sailing there remember the

entirely oriental, backward, medieval country then ruled by a Sul
tan, a ruler who was at the same time the spiritual head of the
state. Turkey was entirely ruled by Mohammedan medieval law.

The women had, to go veiled; polygamy existed; there was no
modern social life whatsoever. After World War I, Turkey under

a great military leader Mustafa Kemal (or as he was called later
Kemal Ataturk) drove out the invading Greeks, and for the first
time in one hundred fifty years Turkey became entirely )nde
pendent from the . intrigues and controls . of foreign powers. Mus
tafa Kemal now began what I regard as the most successful pro-,
cess of modernization done anywhere in Asia. Much more suc
cessful than not only the other Asiatic peoples but also than

the Communists, because Mustafa Kemal did it without any super
ffous cruelty, without barbarizing the land. He tried to establish
there something like a modern European nation and he has suc
ceeded to an astonishing degree; Greece today is torn by internal
dissension, Greece is not a nation. Persia is a backward country,
certainly not a nation, and the Russians could cut through Persia
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like a knife cuts through butter. Turkey is different; Turkey is an
organic, integrated nation since Mustafa Kemal. It would be a
tremendous task for the Russians to conquer Turkey, and they

know it very well. The "secularization" of Turkey took her away

from her ancient Mohammedan medieval order to be modernized
and to be equipped as a modern nation. Think only of the position
of the women; there is no polygamy in Turkey anymore. In
Turkey today modern European law absolutely prevails.

Women

are no longer veiled; women can participate fully in all social and
political life, a tremendous change in a few years time. I am

convinced that in that direction all the Middle Eastern people will

go. It will take much longer with the Arabs, or with the Persians.
The Arabs are today disunited; still not a modern nation like the
Turks but they are on the way to it and it is· immensely im
portant, as the British have understood, to help this develop
ment forward instead of trying to hinder it.
I am optimistic about the Middle East. Our position in the
Middle East, or the British one, which is for all practical pur
poses one and the same, is strategically sound and can be and

will be, in my opinion, politically sound, because we need the Mid
dle East and ultimately the Middle East needs us, needs us not
only for protection against Russia. The Middle East cannot en
ter by its own strength upon a sound policy of economic and
social modernization-only American and British capital and
American and British educational and technical help can provide

the means. One hundred fifty years ago the Middle East was
opened up. Since then it has formed a bridge between Europe,
Asia and Africa. I'm convinced it is a strong bridge, one which
can easily become a very important factor in the defense system of
Western civilization and world peace.
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THE HERITAGE OF TYRE
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U. S. N.
at the Naval War College
December 17, 1948

Since man first sat astride a floating log and propelled
himself with a piece of driftwood, the waterways have served
not only as frontiers but as areas of conflict and avenues of in
tercourse between peoples. It is, for instance, the ocean routes and
not the impassable land barriers between them which truly .join
North and South America. The same was true in the old world.
The Mediterranean, though separating three continents, was the
chief means of contact, conflict and the spread of the civilization
which grew up along its shores. Here trade, piracy, and organ
ized sea warfare seemed to have flourished from pre-historic times.
The first great seafaring people were apparently the
Cretans or Minoans, but Phoenicia with her great port of Tyre was
the first maritime nation of which we know the history. Phoeni
cian ships more than 12 centuries before Christ were receiving
the wealth of the East, and distributing it along the shores of the
Mediterranean. It is hard to overstress the importance of these
early mariners as builders of civilization. The venturesome ex
plorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port not only
opened up a new source of wealth for himself but also quickened
civilization at both ends of his route. The cargo ships that left
the Nile Delta distributed the arts of Egypt as well as her wheat.
Greece, was the next nation after Phoenicia to become a
sea power, and her great victory over Xerxes navy at Salamis was
Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President, Naval War Col
lege. During the war he served as Chief of Staff to Commander
Carrier Division One, and commanded the Kalinin Bay and the
Hornet.
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what really ended the menace of Persia on European soil. Upon
its issue depended the Golden Age of Athens which reached its
flower in the 80 years following, and which could hardly have come
had Greece fallen under the demoralizing influence of oriental
rule. Salamis was therefore a victory not only for Greece but for
all of mankind.
Two centuries elapsed between the Greek victory at Salamis
and the Punic Wars, a second great struggle between alien races
for Mediterranean control. Here again it can be said that the wel:
fare of mankind rode with victory in that struggle. Compared
with the culture of Rome, with its law, engineering and ideals of
practical efficiency, the civilization of Carthage was barren and
sterile.
Carthage, herself a Phoenician colony, had centuries of ex
perience in seafaring and sea fighting while Rome was predomi
nantly a land power. But Rome was young, lean and hard while
Carthage was old, and ripe for plucking. So Rome took to the sea
and, after a long struggle, destroyed Carthaginian sea power.
Thus was Rome forced
then, in turn, became dominant
through sea power she gained
turies the Mediterranean was
nostrum ( our sea) •

reluctantly upon the sea. Rome
on every Mediterranean shore and,
the world. For the next six cen
to remain for the Romans mare

In the year 328 A. D., the Emperor Constantine the Great
shifted his capitol from Rome to Byzantium now known as Is
tanbul but best known to us as Constantinople. It is a strange
commentary upon the indifference of us of the western world that
we could owe an incalculable debt to the eastern Roman Empire and
yet remain so ignorant on the subject. While Rome fell apart and
,
Europe broke up in chaos and descended into the Dark Ages, a single
citadel of western culture stood fast at Constantinople, a preserver
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of Christianity and the cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, as
well as a civilizing influence upon slavic people to the northward.
For a period of over 700 years, a time longer than from her final
fall in 1453 until today, Byzantium alone stayed the westward
sweep of Mohammedanism under first the Saracen and then the
Turk until the weak states of Europe could grow strong enough
to finally halt the sons of the prophet at the gates of Vienna.
Again, it is a story of the East against the West, of the struggle
of alien peoples for the Mediterranean. And it is a story of sea
power.
During her 1000 years of life, Byzantium stood firm only as
long as she kept hold on the sea. Each time she failed to do this
her strength dwindled until at last she had shrunk to a mere city
fortress the doom of which was assured long before it fell. The
Turks finally took Constantinople after a brief siege of seven
weeks.
The resulting Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean was
the direct cause of the great voyages of discovery. Blocked by
the Turks fro.m the old caravan trade routes to China, the West
turned toward the open sea to seek Cathay west across the At
lantic· and south around Africa.

,,

The rise of Portugal was a spectacular phenomenon of the
Age of Discovery. Her intrepid navigators rounded Africa to
open a sea. route to the Indies and made Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire and claims to dominion
over half the seas of the world. But the Portuguese system of
colonial administration or rather exploitation, was even worse than
Spain's and. Portugal fell back into the ranks of lesser states.
The rise and fall of Spain is a tragic parallel of Portugal's.
As Portugal first turned south and east, Spain was to go westward
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to Mexico and Peru to carry her pillage and her conquest. From
the ancient Aztec and Inca empires Spain was to wring the gold
and silver with which to finance the next centuries of wars, wars
whose outcomes were to give racial, religious, and political form
to the world in which we live. But Spain, too, was to fail due to
many causes which may be roughly summed up as a lack of mari
time genius.
Next it was Holland whose turn it was to flash dramatically
across the pages of history. Her rise to wealth and power was a
tribute to Dutch character, integrity, hard-headed business sense
and native maritime genius, for it was the sea alone which gave
Holland an avenue to greatness. Her fall came after she had spent
herself against the maritime strength of England.
France too was to make her bid for sea -power and French
naval history is a story of promise· alternating with· disappoint
ment. The French navy has known periods of great glory and, in its
lowest estate, never dishonored the military reputation so dear to •
that nation. Yet as a maritime nation, France has never held more
than a respectable position.
Some peculiar quirk of national character seemed to color the
naval strategy of France. Her officers sought to economize their
fleet, to use it in commerce warfare rather than in battle. Even
when fortune favored France, she lost golden opportunities due
to this fatal weakness which corrupted her officers. The English
officer, on the contrary, sought out the enemy and took the of
fe:nsive, retrieving many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
hard hitting.
This brings us to England where we will pick up the threads
of our story and tie them together, for the true story of modern
sea power until aft�r the turn of this the 20th century has been
the history of England. While others rose to shine but briefly
36
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though often brilliantly, she was to climb steadily until she be
came the acknowledged mistress of the seas. This control of the
sea exercised by England was not the gift of fortune. It was a
prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in peace and hard fight
ing in war.
England first defeated the Spanish Navy, and then it was
Holland who must meet the challenge of the British Isles. There
followed three great wars in which the Dutch fought with epic
gallantry. But in the Third Dutch War France teamed up with
England, and Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Faced on
the land by France, the dominating military power, and on the sea
by the combined might of the British and French navies, all
seemed lost. And yet Holland was not defeated. She opened
her dikes to check the armies of invasion and, under her great
Admiral deRyder, fought the navies of France and England to a
standstill. When peace eventually came all honors were hers but
she was an exhausted and prostrate land, and Holland, like Spain,
settled back in slow decline.
This enmity of the French king for the Dutch which led him
to team up with the English had gained nothing for France and
everything for England. Unwittingly Louis XIV had built up the
only country that could become the greatest colonial and maritime
rival of France. A series of wars were now to blaze forth be
tween England and France with such frequency that the two na
tions were to remain at daggers' points for the next century and
a quarter.
Time permits only the barest mention of a few of these
wars, important though they be. In the Seven Years' War, the
British Fleet was to prove a priceless weapon. Teamed up with
Wolfe, that 18th century master of amphibious warfare, it was
37
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to wreck the French colonial Elmpire. The Seven Years' War
finally ended in terms of deepest humiliation to France. She was
compelled to renounce to England all of Canada ,the Ohio Valley and
the entire area east of the Mississippi, except the then sickly

little settlement at New Orleans.

No peace such as., that following the Seven Years' Wars
could be permanent. Every patriotic Frenchman burned with a
passion for revenge. The · opportunity came with the American
Revolution. From the outset France was unneutral and, after the
capture of Burgoyne, she decided to enter the war openly. It may
seem startingly to say, but the Revolutionary War was as much
naval as it was military.

Before the entry of France, the English

kept their army supplied by sea and forced Washington into the

cruel depths of Valley Forge. George Washington, himself, ac

knowledged it was the French Navy that really saved America.

And the final victory, which was assured when Cornwallis sur
rendered at Yorktown, came from a temporary loss of control of
Cornwallis' sea communications.

Ten years after the American Revolution British sea power

was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with

France following· the French Revolution. As the war dragged on,
Spain and Holland were to add their navies to that of France and

the rise of Bonaparte was to make France supreme on the Con
tinent. But the magnitude of these events on land during · which

Napoleon fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew king.,
doms, and remade the map of Europe, obscures the prime im
portance of the warfare that went on the sea. For it was Great
Britain by virtue of her navy and insular position that remained
Napoleon's least vulnerable and most obstinate opponent, forc
ing him to ever renewed and exhausting campaigns, reviving con
tinental opposition and supporting it with subsidies made possi
ble by control of sea trade.
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Finally, at Trafalgar, the English won a signal victory
against a much larger French fleet in what is universally ac
counted one of the decisive battles of the world. Napoleon who
had been planning an invasion of England faced his army back
towards the Continent saying: "It will be Britain that forces us
to conquer Europe." The great conqueror had set his feet .on
the path leading to Moscow and Waterloo.

It was in that same June of 1812 when Napoleon gath

ered his "army of twenty nations" for the Russian Campaign
that the United States declared war on Great Britain. The tiny

American Navy fought brilliantly but was inevitably smothered

by weight of numbers and the final peace settled none of the dif
ferences that had begun the war.
The remainder of the 19th century was to be a period of

relative peace thanks to the British naval predominance which
had broken the Napoleonic hegemony, stripped France of practi

cally all of her American possessions· and made . America north of
the Rio Grande English in speech, laws and traditions. The Union
blockade crippled the finances of the South, shut out munitions and
food stuffs, and was a major factor in the downfall of the Con

federacy. The Japanese defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Bat
tle of the Yalu in 1894, marked the emergence of Japan as a formid:

able force in international affairs and brought in a period of in
tensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East. And
finally in 1898, the last sorry act was played out in dying Spanish
sea power. Spain was ignominously defeated in both the Battles
of Manila Bay and Santiago.
In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out in best Japan
ese tradition by a vicious attack without declaration of war. This
war was marked by two great Japanese naval victories; the first
off Port Arthur on August 10, 1904 and the second in Tsushima
Straits on the 27th of May, 1905.
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The Russo-Japanese War greatly weakened Russia's posi

tion in Europe, leaving the dual alliance of France and Russia out
weighed by that of Germany and Austria.

This upsetting of the

European balance of power coupled with Germany's commercial

rivalry and the growing might of the German navy forced Eng

land to abandon her neutral position in between and the First
World War was to find her on the side of France and Russia.

World War I was fundamentally akin to the Napoleonic

Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Contin
ent and naval power supreme on the seas.

was soon to make its strangling power felt.

The English blockade
As had the French

before them, the Germans retaliated with commerce raiding.

But

unlike France, Germany had the submarine, which was soon to
prove one of the greatest perils of the sea.

Its effective

ness was to be deeply underscored by the almost complete Eng
lish dependency upon the sea. The battle against the submarine
was finally won but the margin was dangerously close.

We need not concern ourselves too closely with the various

naval actions of the First World War.

The English fleet was to

keep the sea while the German fleet found it impossible to break

out through the steel ring of Britain.

However, we should briefly

review the one great naval battle of the war which was fought at

Jutland. Here England won at least a strategic victory but failed to

destroy the German fleet.

Had England won an epic victory, Jut

land would have marked the turning point of the war instead of
leading, in Churchill's own words, "Directly to the submarine peril
of 1917."

The German submarine campaign could never have at

tained the effectiveness it did.

But most important of all, Russia

could have been kept in the war.

For, paradoxically, the first
victim" of sea power in World War I was not Germany, but Eng-
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land's ally Russia who succumbed to the German Navy.

Ninety

percent of Russia's imports were cut off by the combined efforts

of the German navy, which blockaded the Baltic, and Germany's
Turkish ally who held the Dardanelles.

Russia suffered terrible

losses from the resulting lack of munitions, and this desperate plight

of Russia was the most compelling reason for the British Dardan
elles' Campaign.

Unfortunately, however;· the Campaign was a

tragic failure, and Russia fell' into ruins. ,
So much for the First World War.

The. Second World War,

with some justification, has been called a continuation of that First
World War which had .been interrupted by .a period of armed truc,e.

Certainly the twenty-five years which began in 1914, have the
qualities of a great .tragedy.

The League of Nations proved to

be an unhappy failure and the world was to watch .the clouds of

war grow ever more ominous.

France by her unwillingness to

make timely concessions to a moderate German government hasten

ed that government's fall which brough. t .into power the ele
ments of extreme dissatisfaction.

EnglB.Ild, disturbed. by French,

predominance, which overthrew
. the balance of, power, was not
.
•. . ,

,,

altogether unsympathetic towards a resurgent Germany.

Am�ri-

ca resolutely .turned .her back on the wprld, d�termined to regain

her historic isolation.

Germany, far from penitent, wished only

to correct mistakes which had somehow robbed her superior war

machine of the fruits of victory and. hoped yet to wrench rich
spoils from decadent :neighbors.

Japan: the most recent and most

irresponsible recruit to Imperialism, was determined to follow her

destiny towards a dream of world domination; while Italy, steeped
in nostalgic dreams of an ancient glory, skulked like a greedy
jackal in the trail of the jungle giants.

By 1933 it was evident that the three nations, Japan, Italy

and Germany, were set upon paths leading inevitably and fatally
to war.

Thereafter, events were to transpire with increasing fre-
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quericy which were to carry the whole world into another mortal

conflict.

It

was now too plain that the forces of aggression could
only be stopped by force, but out of an anarchy of compromise, a
policy of appeasement had been born and Germany's opponents
were to absorb even ruder shocks before their deep-rooted anti-war
sentiments could be overcome. Finally in 1938, the world saw

the supreme humiliation of England at Munich, and when on
September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, England and
France, pushed beyond all limits, declared war two days later. The
Second World War had begun. Or had it begun in 1937 with the
Japanese invasion of China; or earlier still, in 1931, when Japan
invaded Manchuria? Indeed, had the troubled peace-begun by the

Armistice and unsolved by the vengeful treaty of Versailles
been other than an armed truce while nations realined and re

armed to continue the struggle to see which one could claw its
way to the top?
In the beginning German victories on the
with such clock-like regularity that, in less than
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France
run. On the 22nd of June, 1940, France signed

Continent came
a year, Poland,
had been over
an humiliating

armistice which was to reduce her to virtual slavery throughout
the remainder of the war.

But across the Channel the British people seemed to sud
denly discover a new reservoir of power and confidence. The
Chamberlain government fell and behind the courageous and dy

namic leadership of Winston Churchill, the English rallied to show
a deathless courage,· a stamina and fortitude worthy · of English

men of any other age.

An outnumbered Royal Air Force fought
back the horde of German aircraft which, with increasing in

tensity throughout the summer, sought to drive it from the skies
as a prelude to invasion.
42
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Finally, defeated in the air over Britain, Germany was to
again turn to the Continent and the Balkan states were overrun
or forced into vassalage. Then on June the 22nd, 1941, Hitler,
like Napoleon before him, was to begin his fateful Russian ad
venture. For a while the German army swept all before it and,
in October and November, victory seemed imminent. Japan de
cided that time was ripe fot her complete entrance into a struggle
bidding fair to recarve the world into totalitarian empires and on
December 7, 1941, began war without warning by an air raid
against the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
What of sea power during this titanic struggle of land and
air warfare, which, in a little over two years, had swept across
the face of the earth?
This time a wiser Germany was able to soften the effects of
blockade by stockpiling, the development of synthetics, and through
conquest, the acquirement . of the stockpiles of neighboring states
and the incorporation into her economy of vast areas with their
sources of raw materials. Thus the negative effect of sea power's
denial of commerce was, temporarily at least, defeated; but Eng
land and her Allies were to continue to enjoy the positive boon
of huge imports throughout the duration of the war.
Germany, recognizing England's complete dependence on
the sea, was to bend every effort to accomplish what she had failed
to do before-sever the British lifeline. - The struggle was to be a
seesaw with the submarine finally going down in defeat, but again
the margin was dangerously close.
Later as America found her strength the sea was to supply a
crushing bomber offerisive and make possible a series of amphibious
operations which finally liberated• Europe and--·destroyed the Ger
man army. It was sea power which won at El Alamein and in the
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later North African invasion. It was the same story in Sicily and
in Italy when the foes of Germany were to return to the Continent
at last. And, again, it was the long arm of sea power that, in the
early dawn of June the 6th, 1944, supported the invasion of France
which was to set the final seal of bankruptcy on German strategy.
But it was in the Pacific that sea power more than ever was
to prove the handmaiden of victory. Fought across the largest
body of water in the world, an ocean only sparsely dotted with small
islands, the war in the Pacific was obviously from the start a naval
war., For no other reason, Japan's first and choice objective was
the American fleet.
You know the rest of the story as well as I. Japan received
her first check in the Coral Sea when a seaborne invasion aimed at
the capture of Port Moresby was forced to turn back. Then came
Midway. Many informed Japanese saw in Midway the turning
point of the war, and so calamitous were the results considered,
that the story was never announced in the homeland until after
final surrender.
Many famous battles were fought and many epic and gallant
deeds were done which have added rich pages to our history. I wish
I had the time to discuss them. But I must rest content by say
ing that the United States succeeded in welding land, sea and air
forces into an amphibious machine which moved amphibiously
across the most forbidding distances in the world and succeeded
in severing Japan from her sources of supply and provided the
bases and the logistic support required by the Air Force in its
great bomber offensive against Japan.
And so to sum up this little thumb nail sketch which covers
all of written history, we find that the prime importance of sea
power is clearly demonstrable from the days of Tyre until today.
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Sea power denies the enemy the sinews of war and provides them

for one's- self. Sea power permits us to carry war to the enemy
thus forcing him to fight at home where it hurts. This will also

ease our own defense requirements, for the enemy will
have to expend precious resources in defense that he might other
wise use in attacking us. Worse than that (from his point of view),
he will grow to live in constant dread of our landings and will have

to spread his forces so thin in order to protect himself in all di

rections that no matter how big his army and air force, he will

find they are never big enough.

For the choice of the point of at

tack is always given to that nation which controls the sea.

"But why seize and build these bases?" I am asked. "Cannot
our airplanes fly there, bomb the enemy, and then get back?"
No, they cannot; that is, none we have built yet can do it. Nor
do our scientists hold out any promise of airplanes that can do so

at any time soon. Of course we can refuel them in the air, but that
is an expensive way to do it. Besides fighters cannotgo along to

protect the bombers, and bombers must have their fighter cover.

But, even if we had super long-range bombers and fighters,
there is another compelling reason why we must have our bomber

bases close to the enemy. If we cut the distance a bomber must fly
in half, we multiply its effectiveness by four. If we cut the dis
tance down to one-fourth, we will multiply its effectiveness by

sixteen.

This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons, includ

ing the guided missile.

The day of the long range guided missile

is still many years -in the future but when it comes, navies will

still be needed to take it closer to the enemy so that we can enjoy

this enormous advantage of multiplying its effectiveness by many,
many fold.

45

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

47

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 2, Art. 1

RESTRICTED
But what about the atomic bomb? Hasn't this changed the
whole complexion of war?
Of course it has. I would be the last to deprecate the terrible
potentialities of this weapon which can only be described in words
of horror. But nothing has changed our fundamental laws. The
way to win a war is still the same and will continue to be the same.
To be victorious war must be carried to the enemy. Atomic bombs
are tremendously expensive. The number will always be too limited
to waste any trying to hit a target thousands of miles away when
we have the means of getting much closer. Germany alone ab
sorbed the equivalent of 200 atomic bombs in the last war. Indeed
Mr. P. M., S. Plunkett, Nobel prize winner and famous physicist,
puts the number in the thousands, but choosing the lesser number,
we do not now have that many nor does it appear that we have
any expectation of ever having that many in the future. But, even
if we do, we must not waste them in a long range effort.
And so, in conclusion, we find that theface of the globe has
not changed, though many have chosen to ignore the continued
existence of the oceans and seas. Even the pictures in our mag
azines which so vividly portray the world as round are actually
misleading. They usually show the part of the world that is land.
They make us forget that three-fourths of the earth's surface is
covered by water, and only one-quarter by land.
New weapons and the increased efficiency of land, sea and
air transportation, have all served to complicate modern living, but
they have not changed the basic facts of life, either in peace or
war. The coming of age of air power as a decisive w:'eapon of
war, is of enormous and far reaching conseque_nces. I, as one who
has spent a quarter of a century in aviation, would be the last to
deprecate this fact. But the case for sea power was never so
strong as it is today. We can lose another war if we ever permit
ourselves to forget it.
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